A state benefits agency runs an orchestrator that sends each application to three eligibility subagents in parallel, one each for housing, childcare and disability support, then merges their findings into one determination letter. During a four-day outage of the housing register, the housing subagent could not complete its lookups, yet no run was marked as failed and no letter mentioned a problem. Appeals later showed that 11 percent of letters issued in that window wrongly stated the applicant was ineligible for housing support, while the childcare and disability findings in the same letters were correct. Which cause does this evidence point to most strongly?
- AThe merge step treats a branch that returned no finding as a negative finding, so a failed lookup became a refusal Correct
- BThe orchestrator briefed the housing subagent with too little applicant detail to reach a sound eligibility decision
- CThe parallel subagents interfered with each other, so another branch's output overwrote the housing subagent's result
- DThe housing subagent's model misread the eligibility rules, so it reached refusals the policy text does not support
Why A is correct: No run failed and no letter flagged a problem, yet the outage produced refusals, which means the failure was absorbed somewhere and reinterpreted. Aggregation that cannot tell a failed branch from a negative result converts an outage into a wrong determination instead of containing it.
Why B is wrong: Thin briefs are a common multi-agent defect, but the briefing did not change during the outage and the wrong refusals are confined to that window. A briefing problem would show up before and after the outage as well.
Why C is wrong: Shared mutable state between parallel branches can corrupt results, but the childcare and disability findings were correct and the errors line up with the register outage, not with concurrency. Cross-branch interference would not track an upstream outage.
Why D is wrong: Blaming model reasoning is tempting when decisions are wrong, but the errors began and ended with the outage while the model and rules were unchanged. The subagent could not complete its lookups at all, so it had nothing to misread.