An enterprise security architect must choose between two postures for credential safety across many organisations. Posture one detects credentials that have already been committed and raises alerts for triage. Posture two refuses pushes that contain recognised credentials so they are never committed in the first place. The architect wants to lead with the posture that keeps secrets out rather than cleaning up after the fact, applied consistently across organisations. Which choice reflects a prevention-first strategy applied at scale?
- ARely on secret scanning alerts alone and route them to an incident queue, because detecting committed secrets quickly is equivalent to preventing their exposure.
- BEnable Dependency Review as a required check across organisations, because blocking risky changes at merge keeps credentials out of the codebase.
- CEnable push protection through a security configuration applied across the organisations, so pushes containing recognised secrets are blocked before the credential is ever committed. Correct
- DSchedule a daily secret scanning sweep across all repositories so any committed credential is found within twenty-four hours and rotated, because shorter exposure windows are prevention-first.
Why A is wrong: Fast detection is valuable, but a committed secret has already been exposed in history and must be revoked and rotated, so this is clean-up after the fact rather than prevention. Equating detection with prevention is the precise mistake the question is probing.
Why B is wrong: Dependency Review gates dependency changes for vulnerabilities and licences, not committed credentials, so it does not address secrets at all. It is a plausible-sounding gate but solves a different problem from keeping tokens out of the repository.
Why C is correct: Push protection stops the secret at the push, so it never enters the repository, which is the prevention-first posture the architect wants. Delivering it through a security configuration applied across organisations is how that posture is enforced consistently at scale. This satisfies both the strategy and the scope requirements.
Why D is wrong: Shrinking the exposure window reduces risk, but the credential is still committed and must be rotated, so this remains a detect-and-remediate posture. Calling a shorter detection cycle prevention-first conflates faster clean-up with stopping the secret from entering at all.