An organisation is moving from a perimeter firewall model towards a zero trust architecture for access to internal applications. A project lead argues that once a device passes the initial login at the network edge it should be trusted for the rest of its session. How should the risk practitioner respond to align with zero trust principles?
- AAgree, because authenticating the device once at the network boundary is the defining control that zero trust relies on to keep internal traffic safe
- BAgree, provided the internal network is first segmented into zones, since segmentation alone delivers the trust assurances that zero trust is intended to provide
- CDisagree, because zero trust depends mainly on encrypting all internal traffic, after which a single session-long authentication becomes perfectly acceptable
- DDisagree, because zero trust assumes no implicit trust and requires continuous verification of identity, device, and context for each access request Correct
Why A is wrong: One-time boundary authentication is the perimeter model zero trust replaces, so endorsing it is tempting familiarity but contradicts the very principle being adopted.
Why B is wrong: Segmentation supports zero trust and so sounds aligned, but on its own it still permits implicit trust within a zone, which is precisely what the model rejects.
Why C is wrong: Encryption protects data in transit and is good practice, but it does not establish trust in the requester, so it cannot justify a single session-long grant under zero trust.
Why D is correct: Zero trust treats every request as untrusted regardless of location, so access decisions are re-evaluated continuously rather than granted once for a whole session.