A company runs 60 accounts in AWS Organizations with all features enabled. Security wants to guarantee that no IAM principal in any member account in the Production organizational unit can disable AWS CloudTrail, regardless of the permissions an account administrator later grants. Which approach enforces this guarantee with the least ongoing effort?
- AAttach an IAM permissions boundary that denies CloudTrail write actions to every role created in each Production member account through a deployment pipeline.
- BAttach a service control policy to the Production organizational unit that denies cloudtrail:StopLogging and cloudtrail:DeleteTrail for all principals in those accounts. Correct
- CEnable an organization trail and rely on the management account administrators to monitor and manually re-enable CloudTrail whenever a member account stops it.
- DCreate a deny-based resource policy on each CloudTrail trail in the Production accounts so that StopLogging and DeleteTrail calls are rejected for member principals.
Why A is wrong: Permissions boundaries cap a principal's permissions but must be attached to each principal individually, so a new role created without the boundary would escape the control.
Why B is correct: An SCP on the OU sets a permission ceiling that no IAM policy in any member account can exceed, so the deny holds even if an administrator later grants the action.
Why C is wrong: An organization trail centralises logging but does not prevent a member principal from stopping logging, and manual remediation is reactive rather than a guarantee.
Why D is wrong: CloudTrail trails do not support a resource policy that blocks management actions, so this control cannot be applied and offers no real enforcement.