A platform team manages access with AWS IAM Identity Center across an organisation of 40 accounts. A single PowerUser permission set is assigned to many teams, but a recent review found it grants access to Amazon S3 buckets that several teams must never reach. Security wants every account that uses this permission set to be unable to call S3 regardless of what the permission set itself allows, while keeping a single change rather than editing dozens of roles. Which control MOST effectively enforces this organisation-wide boundary?
- AEdit the PowerUser permission set in IAM Identity Center to add an explicit deny on all Amazon S3 actions, then let Identity Center automatically re-provision the updated role into each and every account where the permission set is currently assigned.
- BAttach an IAM permission boundary that denies Amazon S3 to each role created by the permission set, replicating the boundary into all assigned accounts with a deployment pipeline so the limit travels with the role.
- CApply a resource-based bucket policy on each Amazon S3 bucket that denies the principals provisioned by the permission set, listing their role ARNs so the buckets reject those callers across all of the accounts.
- DCreate a service control policy that denies all Amazon S3 actions and attach it to the organisational units containing the affected accounts, so no principal in those accounts can call S3 even if an identity policy allows it. Correct
Why A is wrong: Adding a deny to the permission set does block S3 for that role and re-provisions everywhere, but it only constrains this one permission set, so any other role or a future permission set in those accounts could still reach S3.
Why B is wrong: A permission boundary can cap a principal's effective permissions, but it must be attached per role and maintained by a pipeline, which is heavier than one change and still misses any principal the boundary is not attached to.
Why C is wrong: Bucket policies only protect the specific buckets they sit on and require enumerating role ARNs, so new buckets and changed role names slip through and the control is not a true account-wide boundary.
Why D is correct: A service control policy sets the maximum permissions for every principal in the targeted accounts, so a deny on S3 at the organisational unit blocks the service org-wide in one place regardless of what any permission set or role grants.