Matching a control to the wrong CIA principle
The wrong answers pick a real control that serves a different CIA principle. HTTPS protects confidentiality in transit, yet a downloaded firmware image still needs a SHA-256 comparison to prove integrity. Backups serve availability, so they cannot stop a thief reading a stolen laptop, where full-disk encryption protects confidentiality. A message authentication code mismatch reveals alteration, which makes it an integrity check even though the code uses a secret key.
See it in a sample questionStrengthening an existing layer instead of adding one
The wrong answers reinforce a control that already exists. A faster firewall, a hot-standby firewall, a second packet-filtering firewall, a stronger edge firewall and stronger passwords each deepen or duplicate one layer. Defence in depth needs a new, independent control elsewhere. Host-based firewalls and antivirus sit behind the perimeter, VLANs with inter-VLAN access control lists contain lateral movement inside the LAN, and a web application firewall inspects HTTP requests that a network firewall permitting port 443 cannot see into.
See it in a sample questionMatching a denial-of-service symptom to the wrong attack
Each wrong answer names a genuine attack that exhausts a different resource. A full backlog of half-open connections in SYN_RECEIVED shows a TCP SYN flood; amplification would instead saturate bandwidth with large UDP responses. Small spoofed UDP queries that make resolvers send far larger responses to a victim show DNS amplification, and no TCP handshake is left half-open. A nearly idle link with connections trickling partial HTTP headers shows Slowloris, which ties up worker threads at the application layer.
See it in a sample questionConfusing ARP poisoning with other redirection attacks
The wrong answers swap ARP poisoning for another attack that also redirects or disrupts traffic. MAC flooding overflows the switch CAM table, DHCP starvation exhausts leases, and DNS poisoning corrupts hostname-to-IP answers. ARP poisoning sends forged replies that bind the gateway's IP address to the attacker's MAC address in victims' caches within the local segment. A forged A record held in a recursive resolver until the TTL expires points to DNS cache poisoning, because ARP works at Layer 2 inside one subnet.
See it in a sample questionBlaming direction or protocol for ACL processing
The wrong answers reach for interface direction, a trailing permit or a protocol rule when the cause is how ACLs are processed. Entries are matched top-down and stop at the first match, so a subnet permit placed above a host deny means the host is never tested against the deny. Every ACL ends with an implicit deny, which drops DNS once only TCP 80 and 443 are permitted. A standard ACL matches the source address alone, so one destination port needs an extended ACL.
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