N10-009 - Network Security (14% of the exam) - Section 4.2
Summarise common network attacks and their impact, including DoS/DDoS, on-path, spoofing, VLAN hopping, and social engineering.
Summarise the attack types a network defender must recognise: denial-of-service and distributed DoS, on-path (man-in-the-middle), ARP and DNS spoofing/poisoning, MAC flooding, VLAN hopping, and rogue access points. Match each attack to its impact and the layer it targets, and distinguish technical attacks from social-engineering techniques such as phishing and tailgating.
Which statement correctly distinguishes DNS cache poisoning from ARP cache poisoning when each is used to set up an on-path attack?
ADNS cache poisoning works at Layer 2 inside a single broadcast domain, whereas ARP poisoning can redirect traffic across routed networks.
BBoth techniques require the attacker to already possess a valid TLS certificate for the target before traffic can be intercepted.
CARP poisoning corrupts hostname-to-IP resolution, while DNS poisoning corrupts the IP-to-MAC mappings held on the local segment.
DDNS poisoning corrupts hostname-to-IP resolution so a name resolves to an attacker address, while ARP poisoning corrupts IP-to-MAC mappings on the local segment.check_circle Correct
DNS poisoning falsifies hostname-to-IP resolution while ARP poisoning falsifies IP-to-MAC mapping on the local segment; both can redirect traffic to an on-path attacker. DNS poisoning and ARP poisoning both redirect victims, but they attack different resolution steps: DNS maps names to IP addresses, and ARP maps IP addresses to MAC addresses on the local link, so corrupting each has a different scope.
Why A is wrong: This reverses the two: ARP poisoning is the Layer 2 technique confined to the local broadcast domain, while DNS poisoning manipulates name resolution and is not bound to a single segment.
Why B is wrong: Neither technique depends on holding a certificate; this is tempting because certificates relate to interception defences, but ARP and DNS poisoning redirect traffic at the link and name-resolution layers regardless of TLS.
Why C is wrong: The two roles are swapped here; the labels look right individually, but ARP handles IP-to-MAC on the local link and DNS handles hostname-to-IP, so the statement inverts their functions.
Why D is correct: DNS poisoning falsifies name-to-address answers so victims connect to attacker-controlled hosts, whereas ARP poisoning falsifies the IP-to-MAC binding within the broadcast domain; the two operate at different layers of resolution.
Answers that look right on this material and are not. Each one is a distractor from a different question in the N10-009 bank for this domain.
DNS cache poisoning of the local resolver
errorWhy it is wrong: It is tempting because both attacks redirect a victim's traffic, but DNS poisoning corrupts name-to-IP resolution and would not rewrite a host's IP-to-MAC entry, and here the gateway IP itself is unchanged.
Port security limiting each port to one MAC
errorWhy it is wrong: Port security is tempting because it hardens access ports, but capping the number of learned MAC addresses stops flooding and rogue devices rather than inspecting ARP payloads for forged IP-to-MAC bindings.
Port security, which restricts how many MAC addresses may be learned on an individual switch access port.
errorWhy it is wrong: Port security limits MAC addresses per port and can curb MAC flooding, but it does not inspect the contents of ARP packets, so a forged ARP reply from an allowed host still poisons victims' caches.