FCP-FGT-AD - Content inspection (20% of the exam) - Section 3.3

Configure application control to monitor and control network applications using deep packet inspection.

Configure an application control profile that uses FortiGuard application categories and individual application signatures to allow, block, or shape specific applications. Apply deep packet inspection to identify applications that run over non-standard ports or use encryption.

application controlAppDBFortiGuard application categoriesapplication signature

Practice question for this objective

Free sampleContent inspectionmedium

An administrator wants application control to block peer-to-peer file sharing traffic that hops between non-standard ports to evade port-based rules. Which characteristic of application control makes it suited to this requirement?

  • AIt rewrites the service object on the policy so that only the registered ports for each application remain open.
  • BIt forces all peer-to-peer sessions through the explicit web proxy where they can be matched by URL category.
  • CIt blocks any session whose packet rate exceeds the configured threshold for peer-to-peer behaviour.
  • DIt uses deep packet inspection to match traffic against application signatures regardless of the TCP or UDP port in use. Correct
Know that application control uses deep packet inspection of signatures to identify applications independent of the port they use. Because application control matches payload patterns and behaviour against the application database rather than relying on port numbers, it recognises peer-to-peer applications that deliberately shift to non-standard ports to evade port-based filtering.

Why A is wrong: Application control does not modify policy service objects; this describes port-based filtering, the very approach the evasive traffic defeats.

Why B is wrong: Peer-to-peer traffic is not URL-based and is not routed through the web proxy by application control, so URL categories cannot identify it; this confuses web filtering with application control.

Why C is wrong: Application control matches on signatures, not on a packet-rate threshold, so rate-based blocking is a plausible-sounding but incorrect description of the mechanism.

Why D is correct: Application control inspects packet payloads and behaviour against the application database, so it identifies the application from its signature even when it uses random or non-standard ports.

See more FCP-FGT-AD practice questions, answers explained.

Exam traps in Content inspection

Answers that look right on this material and are not. Each one is a distractor from a different question in the FCP-FGT-AD bank for this domain.

  • FortiGate decrypts the TLS payload using certificate inspection and reads the HTTP host header to match the application signature.

    Why it is wrong: Certificate inspection does not decrypt the payload, so it cannot read an HTTP host header inside the encrypted stream; this confuses certificate inspection with full deep inspection.

  • Application control maintains a mapping of every application to its registered well-known port and blocks any session whose port does not match the expected service.

    Why it is wrong: Tempting because port-to-service mapping sounds rigorous, but this is exactly the port-based approach application control replaces; an application hiding on port 443 would simply match the web service and evade detection.

  • Application control signatures only run against plaintext protocols, so any application carried over TLS is invisible to the engine regardless of the SSL inspection mode configured on the policy.

    Why it is wrong: Tempting because the app is now encrypted, but it is wrong: many TLS apps are recognised by handshake metadata under certificate inspection, and full payload detection works once deep inspection decrypts the flow.

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