CRISC domain - 22% of the exam

Risk Assessment

Risk Assessment is 22% of the CRISC exam. These are the objectives it covers, each with practice questions, with every answer explained.

The domain in numbers

64
Practice questions
7
Objectives
34
Medium
30
Hard

Where people go wrong

  • Giving one assessment approach another's outputs

    The wrong answers hand one assessment approach the strengths of another. High, medium and low ratings are treated as monetary, and annualised loss expectancy or return on security investment is attached to qualitative analysis. Qualitative analysis ranks risks on ordinal scales and suits sparse loss history. Quantitative analysis derives annualised loss expectancy from event frequency and monetary impact. A semi-quantitative approach keeps ordinal bands but binds each band to numeric ranges, so closely ranked risks separate without full monetary data.

    See it in a sample question
  • Reporting exposure at the wrong point in the control lifecycle

    The wrong answers report exposure measured at the wrong stage. Exposure after current safeguards is offered as the inherent figure, and a projected residual risk is offered in its place. Inherent risk is the level present before any controls, so it ranks systems for review before control effectiveness is known. Residual risk is what remains after controls operate, differs between two systems with the same inherent rating when controls are bypassed, and is rarely if ever reduced to zero.

    See it in a sample question
  • Labelling a control failure with the wrong deficiency type

    The wrong answers name the wrong kind of deficiency. A well-designed control that operators bypass is an operating effectiveness deficiency. A reconciliation that runs flawlessly but compares only transaction counts is a design deficiency, because it cannot meet its objective even when operated perfectly. A control gap is the complete absence of a needed control, such as a hardening baseline that was never mandated. A control that exists and runs rules out a gap.

    See it in a sample question
  • Filing a scenario element under the wrong label

    The wrong answers file a scenario element under the wrong label. A line about customers unable to complete transactions for several hours is the loss consequence, not the risk event or a vulnerability. In a draft where an attacker exploits an unpatched web server to encrypt production databases, the attacker is the threat source, the unpatched server the vulnerability, and the encryption of the databases the risk event. Event frequency states how often the event is expected; loss magnitude states how bad one occurrence is.

    See it in a sample question
  • Choosing a respected standard whose scope does not fit

    The wrong answers pick a respected standard whose scope does not match the stated need. ISO 31000 supplies risk principles, a governance framework and a generic process for any activity, whereas COBIT focuses on IT governance and PCI DSS is a control mandate for card data. ISO 27005 supports an existing ISO 27001 management system. The NIST Risk Management Framework sequences categorise, select, implement, assess, authorise and monitor, while the NIST Cybersecurity Framework organises work around identify, protect, detect, respond and recover.

    See it in a sample question

Objectives in this domain

What to study

The official documents this domain's practice questions cite most.

Sample questions from this domain

Free sampleRisk Assessmenthard

An organisation has only limited historical loss data and the board wants a fast view of how several new technology risks rank against one another. Which characteristic makes a qualitative analysis the more defensible choice than a quantitative one in this situation?

  • AIt produces a precise monetary loss figure for each risk, so the board can compare exposures directly against the annual control budget in currency terms.
  • BIt removes analyst judgement from the rating, so two independent assessors will always arrive at exactly the same ranking for every risk.
  • CIt expresses likelihood and impact on ordinal scales, so relative ranking is possible without the reliable loss frequencies a quantitative model demands. Correct
  • DIt calculates an annualised loss expectancy for each risk, so a return on the security investment can be derived directly from the ratings.
Qualitative analysis ranks risks on ordinal scales and suits situations where reliable numeric loss data is unavailable. Qualitative analysis rates likelihood and impact on ordinal scales such as high, medium and low, letting an organisation rank risks relative to each other quickly. It is the defensible choice when historical loss data is too sparse to support the credible frequencies and values that quantitative modelling requires.

Why A is wrong: Producing precise monetary figures is the strength of quantitative analysis, not qualitative, so this attributes the wrong capability to the chosen method.

Why B is wrong: Qualitative analysis relies heavily on subjective judgement and does not guarantee identical results, so claiming it removes judgement is the opposite of the truth.

Why C is correct: Qualitative analysis uses ordinal high, medium and low scales to rank risks relative to each other, which suits sparse data where credible numeric frequencies are unavailable.

Why D is wrong: Annualised loss expectancy and return on security investment are outputs of quantitative analysis, so attaching them to a qualitative method confuses the two approaches.

Free sampleRisk Assessmenthard

During a review, an executive states that because a strong set of controls has been deployed on a trading system, its residual risk has effectively been reduced to zero. The risk practitioner must correct this view. Which statement MOST accurately describes the relationship between controls and residual risk?

  • AResidual risk is the exposure that remains after controls operate, and even effective controls leave some exposure, so it is rarely if ever reduced to zero. Correct
  • BResidual risk equals inherent risk until controls are independently tested, after which it can be recorded as zero once each control passes its first effectiveness test.
  • CResidual risk rises and falls with the number of controls applied, so deploying enough additional controls will always bring the remaining exposure down to zero in practice.
  • DResidual risk is simply the inherent risk minus the design strength of the controls, so a strong control design reduces the remaining exposure to a negligible figure of zero.
Residual risk is the exposure remaining after controls operate and is rarely reduced to zero, because no control set is perfectly effective. Residual risk is what remains once controls have acted on inherent risk. Controls lower likelihood or impact but cannot guarantee complete elimination, and they can themselves fail, so a meaningful residual exposure almost always persists even when controls are strong and well designed.

Why A is correct: Controls reduce but seldom fully remove exposure, so some residual risk almost always remains; describing it as reduced to zero ignores control limits and the chance of failure.

Why B is wrong: Testing confirms a control operates, but a passing test does not eliminate exposure, so treating a tested control as reducing residual risk to zero misstates what testing demonstrates.

Why C is wrong: Adding controls generally lowers exposure with diminishing returns, but stacking controls cannot guarantee zero residual risk because no control set is perfectly effective.

Why D is wrong: Design strength matters, but residual risk reflects how controls actually operate, not their design rating, and even strong designs leave exposure rather than reaching zero.

Free sampleRisk Assessmenthard

A control was rated effective at design but a deficiency analysis finds operators routinely bypass a mandatory dual-approval step during busy periods. How should the risk practitioner classify this finding?

  • AAn operating effectiveness deficiency, because the well-designed control is not executed as intended in practice Correct
  • BA design effectiveness deficiency, because the control was conceived without the safeguards needed to function
  • CAn inherent risk increase, because the underlying process is now more exposed than it was first assessed to be
  • DA risk acceptance decision, because management has tolerated the bypass during the recurring busy operating periods
Classify a control that is well designed but not executed as intended as an operating effectiveness deficiency, distinct from a design deficiency. Controls are assessed for both design effectiveness and operating effectiveness. A control sound on paper but routinely bypassed in practice fails the operating test while passing the design test, so the correct classification is an operating effectiveness deficiency, which the practitioner reports so residual risk and any acceptance decision can be evaluated.

Why A is correct: When a sound design is not followed during operation, the weakness lies in execution, which is precisely an operating effectiveness deficiency rather than a flaw in how the control was designed.

Why B is wrong: Blaming the design is tempting, but the scenario states the control was rated effective at design; the failure appears only when operators bypass it, so the fault is in operation.

Why C is wrong: Inherent risk is the exposure before controls and does not change because operators skip a step; what shifts here is residual risk through weakened operating effectiveness.

Why D is wrong: Tolerated bypassing may look like acceptance, but informal workarounds are not a documented risk acceptance; the practitioner must first record the operating deficiency for a decision.

Free sampleRisk Assessmentmedium

While reviewing a draft risk scenario, a practitioner reads the line 'customers are unable to complete transactions for several hours'. Within the scenario structure, how should this element be classified?

  • AThe threat actor, because it identifies the party whose action initiates the risk scenario
  • BThe vulnerability, because it shows the weakness the threat exploited to reach the asset
  • CThe loss consequence, because it states the business impact that results from the risk event Correct
  • DThe risk event, because it is the discrete occurrence that the scenario is constructed around
Inability to deliver a service is the loss consequence, distinct from the risk event that caused it. A loss consequence states the business impact arising after a risk event, so describing customers being unable to transact captures the effect rather than the triggering occurrence or the underlying weakness.

Why A is wrong: An outage of service is an outcome, not an agent; nothing here names who or what triggers the event, so it cannot be the threat actor.

Why B is wrong: It is tempting to read an outage as a weakness, but a vulnerability is the exploitable flaw, whereas this line describes the effect once the event has occurred.

Why C is correct: An inability to transact for hours is the business effect flowing from the event, which is precisely what the loss consequence element captures in a scenario.

Why D is wrong: The risk event is the triggering occurrence such as a failure or breach; the stated inability to transact is the downstream impact of that event, not the event itself.

Free sampleRisk Assessmentmedium

A federal agency contractor must align its information system risk activities with a recognised United States government methodology that defines categorise, select, implement, assess, authorise and monitor as sequential steps. Which framework is the agency contractor following?

  • AThe ISO 31000 framework, which structures risk work around establishing context, assessment, treatment and ongoing communication of risk.
  • BThe COSO ERM framework, which structures risk around governance, strategy, performance, review and information components.
  • CThe NIST Risk Management Framework, which sequences categorise, select, implement, assess, authorise and monitor for federal systems. Correct
  • DThe FAIR framework, which structures risk around decomposing loss event frequency and loss magnitude into quantified factors.
Identify the NIST Risk Management Framework by its six-step categorise-to-monitor lifecycle used for United States federal information systems. The NIST RMF in SP 800-37 prescribes six ordered steps - categorise, select, implement, assess, authorise and monitor - to bring federal information systems through to an authorisation decision and continuous monitoring, which no other listed framework defines.

Why A is wrong: It is tempting because it is process-based, but its stages are context, assessment and treatment, not the six categorise-through-monitor steps the question names.

Why B is wrong: It is plausible as an enterprise risk reference, yet COSO ERM uses governance and performance components, not the federal system authorisation steps described.

Why C is correct: The NIST RMF in SP 800-37 defines exactly those six steps to manage security and privacy risk for information systems, making it the correct match for the agency context.

Why D is wrong: It is attractive because it is a recognised risk model, but FAIR is a quantitative analysis method and does not define a categorise-to-authorise control lifecycle.

Other domains in this exam

See also the CRISC cert hub, the study guide, and the cheat sheet.

Examworthy is not affiliated with or endorsed by ISACA. Original, blueprint-aligned practice material only.