A defence research lab is selecting a formal security model for a multi-level workstation that will hold material at Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret. Auditors have stressed that an analyst cleared to Secret must never see Top Secret intelligence on screen, but may be required to file routine status notes into a Top Secret incident log. Which statement most accurately characterises how the Bell-LaPadula model handles this requirement?
- ABell-LaPadula enforces confidentiality through the simple security property (no read up) and the star property (no write down), which together permit the Secret analyst to append to a Top Secret log without exposing Top Secret content. Correct
- BBell-LaPadula relies on the simple integrity property and the star integrity property, which would prevent the Secret analyst from contributing to a Top Secret log because writing up could corrupt higher-assurance data.
- CBell-LaPadula uses a strong tranquillity principle that freezes labels for the duration of a session, which would force the Secret analyst to be re-cleared to Top Secret before any append could be performed.
- DBell-LaPadula applies the discretionary security property as its primary control, which would let the data owner grant the Secret analyst a read-up exception on a per-file basis for the Top Secret log.
Why A is correct: Correct. The simple security property prevents reading objects at a higher classification, and the star property prevents writing to a lower classification, so a Secret subject can write up to a Top Secret object but cannot read its contents, matching the lab's requirement precisely.
Why B is wrong: Tempting because the property names sound parallel, but those are Biba integrity properties, not Bell-LaPadula confidentiality properties; Bell-LaPadula is silent on integrity and would not block a write up on integrity grounds.
Why C is wrong: Strong tranquillity is a real Bell-LaPadula concept, but it constrains label changes on subjects and objects, not the legitimacy of a write-up; a Secret subject may still write to a Top Secret object without any clearance change.
Why D is wrong: The discretionary security property does exist in Bell-LaPadula as a need-to-know overlay, but it cannot override the mandatory simple security property; no discretionary grant can authorise reading up to Top Secret.