A regional bank is launching a public-facing mobile banking app that will call its own first-party REST APIs and a third-party budgeting partner's API on behalf of customers. The CISO wants the customer to authenticate once with strong assurance, the mobile app to never see the partner's tokens, and the partner to receive only the consents the customer approved. Which authentication and authorisation architecture should the security architect recommend as the BEST fit?
- AImplement OpenID Connect for customer authentication at the bank's IdP and use OAuth 2.0 authorisation code with PKCE so the mobile app obtains scoped access tokens, with a separate token exchange for the partner API. Correct
- BIssue customers a SAML 2.0 assertion from the bank's IdP and have the mobile app post it directly to the partner's SaaS endpoint as a bearer credential.
- CUse the OAuth 2.0 resource owner password credentials grant so the mobile app collects the bank password once and stores a long-lived refresh token for both the bank and partner APIs.
- DFront the APIs with a RADIUS server that authenticates each API call using the customer's banking PIN as a shared secret over TLS.
Why A is correct: OIDC handles the authentication assertion (id_token) while OAuth 2.0 authorisation code with PKCE is the recommended public-client flow for mobile apps, and scoped access tokens plus token exchange let the partner receive only the consents granted without seeing customer credentials.
Why B is wrong: SAML is optimised for browser-based SSO between enterprise web applications, not for native mobile clients calling REST APIs, and forwarding the assertion to the partner gives the partner full session rights rather than scoped consent.
Why C is wrong: ROPC requires the client to handle the user's primary credentials and is deprecated for public clients precisely because it defeats consent, MFA prompts, and credential isolation, all of which the CISO explicitly required.
Why D is wrong: RADIUS is a network access authentication protocol for devices such as VPN concentrators and Wi-Fi controllers, not a token-issuing authorisation framework for federated mobile API access, and per-call PIN replay is poor assurance.