The CIPP-US blueprint is split across 5 domains. Weights are the official share of the exam; see the official exam guide for the authoritative breakdown.
What you must be able to do. Identify which source of law and which enforcer governs a situation, and walk personal data from inventory through to a defensible retention decision.
In one sentenceThe foundations the rest of the exam assumes: the four sources of US law, who enforces privacy, and the information-management discipline that carries the most marks here.
Recall check: answer these from memory first
- Name the four sources of US law and give one privacy obligation that flows from each.
- What does FTC Act Section 5 prohibit, and why is it called the cross-sector backstop?
- Walk a data inventory through to a retention decision: name the steps in order.
What it tests. The foundations of US privacy regulation: the four sources of law (constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law) and how each creates obligations, the enforcement roles of the FTC, sector regulators, and state attorneys general, and the information-management discipline (data inventory, classification, flow mapping, retention) that the official study guide flags as the highest-weighted chapter. It also reaches into cross-border transfer mechanisms and the information-fiduciary concept.
How to study it. Build the mental map before the detail: who makes law, who enforces it, and why the US has no single omnibus statute. Memorise FTC Act Section 5 (unfair or deceptive acts) as the cross-sector backstop, because it threads through later domains. Give the information-management section real time, not a skim, since it carries the most marks here: be able to walk a data inventory through to a retention decision. Treat transfers and fiduciary duty as the harder, lower-frequency items.
Easy to confuse
- Statutory law versus common law. Statutory law is enacted by a legislature (HIPAA, GLBA); common law is judge-made through court decisions, such as the privacy torts. A scenario about a published statute points to the former; one about a tort claim such as intrusion upon seclusion points to the latter.
- FTC enforcement versus state attorney general enforcement. The FTC enforces Section 5 and federal privacy rules at the national level; a state attorney general enforces that state's own privacy and consumer laws, and often shares enforcement of statutes like CCPA. The named actor and the cited law tell you which enforcer the question wants.
- Data classification versus data inventory. An inventory records what data you hold and where it lives; classification labels each category by sensitivity so handling rules attach to it. Inventory answers what and where; classification answers how protected, and the two are sequential steps, not synonyms.
Worked example from the CIPP-US bank
lock_openFree sampleIntroduction to the U.S. Privacy Environmentmedium
A technology company has not violated any specific privacy statute, yet the Federal Trade Commission opens an enforcement action alleging the company misrepresented its data-sharing practices to consumers. On what legal source does the FTC most directly rely to bring this action?
- AThe common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion, which the FTC enforces on behalf of consumers in federal court.
- BIts statutory authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act to challenge unfair or deceptive acts or practices.check_circle Correct
- CA constitutional right to fair dealing implied by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
- DA self-regulatory code of conduct that the company adopted and the FTC enforces as binding federal regulation.
Identify Section 5 of the FTC Act as the statutory basis for FTC enforcement against deceptive privacy representations. The FTC's general enforcement power comes from Section 5 of the FTC Act, which bars unfair or deceptive acts or practices, allowing action against misrepresentations even absent a sector-specific privacy statute.
Why A is wrong: Tempting because intrusion is a privacy wrong, but it is a private tort claim brought by individuals, not a statutory power the FTC invokes for enforcement.
Why B is correct: Correct: Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices, letting the FTC act on a misrepresentation even where no specific privacy statute applies.
Why C is wrong: Tempting because due process sounds protective, but it limits government conduct toward individuals and is not the source of FTC authority over deceptive business practices.
Why D is wrong: Tempting because broken promises in a code can support a case, but the code is not itself the legal source, and the FTC's authority flows from the FTC Act.
What you must be able to do. From the actor and the data type, pick the single sector statute that governs, and state the right or obligation it creates.
In one sentenceThe single heaviest domain: the federal sector laws (FTC, COPPA, HIPAA, GLBA, FCRA, FERPA, and the marketing statutes) that constrain how private companies handle personal data.
Recall check: answer these from memory first
- Give the one-line trigger for GLBA, FCRA, HIPAA, COPPA, and FERPA: who each regulates and what data.
- What does HIPAA's Privacy Rule govern, and what does its Security Rule govern?
- State COPPA's age threshold and the core consent it requires before collecting a child's data.
What it tests. The sector-specific federal laws that constrain how private companies collect and use personal data, and this is the single heaviest domain. It covers the FTC's authority plus COPPA for children, HIPAA and HITECH for health data, GLBA and FCRA/FACTA for financial and credit data, FERPA for education records, the TCPA, Telemarketing Sales Rule, and CAN-SPAM for marketing, and privacy due diligence in mergers and acquisitions.
How to study it. This domain wins or loses the exam, so spend the most time here. Build a one-line trigger for each law: who it regulates, what data, what right or obligation it creates. The classic trap is confusing adjacent regimes, so drill the pairs directly: GLBA (financial institutions, privacy notice and Safeguards) against FCRA (consumer reporting agencies, adverse-action notice and accuracy), and HIPAA's Privacy Rule (uses and disclosures of PHI) against its Security Rule (safeguards). Learn COPPA's age line and the CAN-SPAM opt-out mechanics as reliable marks.
Easy to confuse
- GLBA versus FCRA. GLBA governs financial institutions and their handling of customer financial information, requiring a privacy notice and the Safeguards Rule; FCRA governs consumer reporting agencies and the use of consumer reports, requiring accuracy and adverse-action notices. A bank sharing customer data points to GLBA; a credit report used to deny an application points to FCRA.
- HIPAA Privacy Rule versus Security Rule. The Privacy Rule sets who may use or disclose protected health information and when; the Security Rule sets the administrative, physical, and technical safeguards for electronic PHI specifically. A question about a permitted disclosure is Privacy Rule; one about encryption or access controls is Security Rule.
- TCPA versus CAN-SPAM. The TCPA governs telephone and text marketing, including the Do Not Call rules and consent for autodialled calls; CAN-SPAM governs commercial email, requiring a working opt-out and accurate headers. The channel named in the scenario, a call or text versus an email, decides which statute applies.
Worked example from the CIPP-US bank
lock_openFree sampleLimits on Private-Sector Collection and Use of Datahard
Counsel is drafting the privacy representations and warranties for a stock purchase agreement covering a target that markets to California consumers. The buyer wants the representations to do real diligence work rather than merely paper over risk. Which drafting choice best serves the buyer's goal of allocating privacy risk to the seller?
- AA narrow representation that the target has a privacy policy posted on its website, with no statement about the accuracy of that policy or compliance with it.
- BA representation that the buyer has independently satisfied itself as to the target's privacy practices and waives reliance on any seller statement about data handling.
- CA representation limited to the statement that no data breach has been publicly disclosed in the past twelve months.
- DA broad representation that the target has at all times complied with all applicable privacy and data protection laws and its own published commitments, qualified only by a disclosure schedule of known exceptions.check_circle Correct
Understand that a broad law-and-commitments compliance representation with a disclosure schedule best shifts privacy risk from buyer to seller. Representations and warranties allocate risk by giving the buyer a contractual remedy if facts differ from what is represented; a broad compliance representation backed by a disclosure schedule both forces the seller to surface known issues and leaves the seller liable for undisclosed non-compliance.
Why A is wrong: This is tempting because it looks like a privacy representation, but mere existence of a posted policy says nothing about compliance, so it gives the buyer almost no protection and fails to allocate risk to the seller.
Why B is wrong: This sounds rigorous but actually waives the buyer's recourse, so a candidate confusing buyer diligence with risk allocation would choose it, while in fact it shifts risk onto the buyer rather than the seller.
Why C is wrong: Public-disclosure-only and a twelve-month window leave undisclosed breaches and broader compliance gaps untouched, so although it addresses one risk it is far too narrow to allocate privacy risk to the seller.
Why D is correct: Correct: a compliance representation tied to applicable law and the target's own commitments, backed by a disclosure schedule and indemnity, shifts unknown privacy exposure to the seller and surfaces known issues for pricing.
What you must be able to do. Rank the legal instrument a request requires by its standard of proof, and tie it to the statute and the side (criminal, national-security, or civil) it comes from.
In one sentenceHow the state and the courts compel private-sector data: law-enforcement instruments and ECPA, the national-security regime, and civil eDiscovery duties.
Recall check: answer these from memory first
- Rank a subpoena, a court order, and a search warrant by the legal standard each requires, lowest to highest.
- What did the USA PATRIOT Act expand, and what did the USA Freedom Act rein back?
- When does the duty to preserve evidence (the litigation hold) attach in civil litigation?
What it tests. How the state and courts compel private-sector data: the law-enforcement authorities (subpoenas, court orders, search warrants, National Security Letters) and the statutes behind them such as ECPA and the Stored Communications Act, the national-security regime (FISA, USA PATRIOT Act, USA Freedom Act), and civil eDiscovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including litigation holds and proportionality.
How to study it. Rank the legal instruments by the standard each requires, from a subpoena up to a warrant, and tie each to its governing statute. Keep the national-security acronyms straight by what each one changed: PATRIOT expanded authorities, USA Freedom reined some back. For the civil side, anchor on the duty to preserve once litigation is reasonably anticipated (the litigation hold) and on proportionality as the limit on discovery. Lower weight, but the Fourth Amendment and ECPA distinctions are worth nailing.
Easy to confuse
- Subpoena versus search warrant. A subpoena compels production on a relevance standard and can be issued without prior judicial probable-cause review; a search warrant requires a judge to find probable cause first. The standard the scenario describes, mere relevance versus probable cause, tells you which instrument is in play.
- National Security Letter versus FISA order. An NSL is issued administratively by the FBI without a court and reaches limited records such as subscriber and transaction data; a FISA order is issued by the FISA Court and can reach foreign-intelligence surveillance and, under Section 215, business records. The dividing line is the authoriser: an NSL needs no court, a FISA order requires the FISA Court.
- PATRIOT Act versus USA Freedom Act. The PATRIOT Act broadened surveillance authorities after 2001; the USA Freedom Act of 2015 narrowed several of them, notably ending bulk telephony-metadata collection. If the scenario describes expansion of access, think PATRIOT; if it describes a curb or sunset on bulk collection, think USA Freedom.
Worked example from the CIPP-US bank
lock_openFree sampleGovernment and Court Access to Private-Sector Informationhard
An FBI agent serves a provider with a National Security Letter and includes a nondisclosure requirement barring the provider from telling anyone, including the affected customer, that it received the NSL. The provider's counsel wants to know how the USA FREEDOM Act altered the legal posture of that nondisclosure requirement. Which statement is correct?
- AThe provider may seek judicial review of the nondisclosure requirement, and the government must periodically reassess whether continued secrecy remains justified.check_circle Correct
- BThe nondisclosure requirement is now permanent once imposed, and the provider has no statutory mechanism to seek its removal at any later time.
- CThe nondisclosure requirement was abolished entirely, so providers receiving NSLs may now freely publish the specific contents of any NSL they receive.
- DThe provider may disclose the NSL only after first obtaining written authorisation from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for each individual customer affected.
USA FREEDOM added judicial review and periodic reassessment for National Security Letter nondisclosure requirements rather than abolishing them. The USA FREEDOM Act left NSL authority intact but reformed the gag provisions, giving recipients access to judicial review and obliging the government to reassess and terminate nondisclosure when secrecy is no longer needed.
Why A is correct: Correct: USA FREEDOM established judicial-review procedures for NSL gag orders and reciprocal notice requiring the government to revisit whether nondisclosure is still warranted.
Why B is wrong: Tempting because NSL gag orders were historically open-ended, but USA FREEDOM created review and termination mechanisms, so the gag is not permanent and unchallengeable.
Why C is wrong: Tempting because reforms increased transparency, but USA FREEDOM did not abolish NSL gags; it added procedures and reciprocal-notice rules rather than removing them.
Why D is wrong: Tempting because the FISC oversees national security matters, but NSL nondisclosure review runs through ordinary judicial-review procedures, not per-customer FISC authorisation.
What you must be able to do. Weigh the employee's reasonable expectation of privacy against the employer's interest, and apply the screening, monitoring, or post-employment rule that controls.
In one sentencePrivacy across the employment life cycle: FCRA-governed screening, ECPA-bounded monitoring, and the obligations that persist after an employee leaves.
Recall check: answer these from memory first
- What FCRA steps must an employer follow before and after taking adverse action on a background check?
- How does ECPA's consent exception let an employer monitor employee communications?
- Name two privacy obligations that survive after an employee's departure.
What it tests. Privacy in the employment relationship across its whole life: pre-employment screening under FCRA and state law (background checks, consumer reports, automated hiring tools), monitoring of employee communications, location, and activity within ECPA consent exceptions and state wiretapping laws, and the obligations that persist after employment ends, such as retention limits and reference-disclosure liability.
How to study it. Frame each item around the employee's reasonable expectation of privacy and the employer's countervailing interest, because that balance decides most scenarios. For screening, reuse the FCRA adverse-action steps you learned in the private-sector domain. For monitoring, learn ECPA's consent exception and remember that some states require all-party consent, which changes the answer. This is a smaller domain and largely conceptual, so a focused pass plus practice secures the marks.
Easy to confuse
- One-party consent versus all-party consent states. Under ECPA and many states, one party to a communication consenting is enough to record it; some states require every party to consent. The same monitoring is lawful in a one-party state and unlawful in an all-party state, so the state named in the scenario can flip the answer.
- Background check via a third party versus an internal check. When an employer uses a third-party consumer reporting agency, FCRA's disclosure, authorisation, and adverse-action duties apply; a purely internal check the employer conducts itself generally falls outside FCRA. Whether a consumer reporting agency is involved decides if FCRA controls.
Worked example from the CIPP-US bank
lock_openFree sampleWorkplace Privacymedium
A US employer engages a consumer reporting agency to run a pre-employment background check on a finalist. The returned consumer report shows a conviction, and the hiring manager intends to reject the candidate because of it. Counsel pauses the rejection to confirm the steps the FCRA requires the employer to take around this adverse action. Which two obligations does the FCRA impose on the employer in this situation? (Select TWO.)
- AGive the candidate a GLBA privacy notice describing the data and an opportunity to opt out of sharing it with non-affiliates.
- BWait a fixed statutory cure period of exactly 30 calendar days after notice so the candidate may correct the record before any decision is finalised.
- CBefore acting, provide the candidate a copy of the report and the CFPB summary of FCRA rights as a pre-adverse-action notice.check_circle Correct
- DNotify the EEOC of the planned rejection so the agency can review whether the criminal record creates a disparate impact.
- EAfter acting, send an adverse-action notice naming the agency, stating it did not make the decision, and noting the right to a free report.check_circle Correct
FCRA employment screening requires a pre-adverse-action package then a separate post-decision adverse-action notice, neither of which a GLBA notice or an EEOC filing satisfies. The FCRA splits the duty into two steps: before adverse action the employer must deliver the report copy plus the CFPB summary of rights so the candidate can respond, and after adverse action it must send a notice naming the agency, disclaiming the agency's role, and explaining dispute and free-report rights. A GLBA opt-out notice, a fixed 30-day cure window, and EEOC pre-notification are not FCRA requirements.
Why A is wrong: Tempting because both statutes touch sensitive data, but the privacy-notice and opt-out regime belongs to the GLBA for financial institutions, not to FCRA background checks.
Why B is wrong: Plausible because FCRA expects a reasonable interval before adverse action, but the statute fixes no 30-day cure period; the waiting time is judged by reasonableness, not a set count of days.
Why C is correct: Correct because FCRA section 604(b)(3) requires the report copy and the summary of consumer rights to reach the candidate before adverse action is taken.
Why D is wrong: Tempting because criminal-record screening raises Title VII disparate-impact concerns, but FCRA imposes no duty to notify the EEOC before rejecting a candidate.
Why E is correct: Correct because FCRA section 615(a) requires the post-decision adverse-action notice identifying the agency, disclaiming its role, and noting the rights to a free report and to dispute.
What you must be able to do. Default to California, then judge whether a higher state floor, a comprehensive state law, BIPA, or a breach-notification rule changes the obligation.
In one sentenceThe fastest-changing material: preemption and the state floor, California's CCPA/CPRA as anchor, the comprehensive state laws beyond it, BIPA, and breach notification.
Recall check: answer these from memory first
- List the core consumer rights the CCPA as amended by the CPRA grants, including the opt-out of sale.
- What makes BIPA distinctive among biometric laws, and why does its private right of action matter?
- Name the four axes for comparing state breach-notification laws.
What it tests. The fastest-changing material: how federal preemption and state authority interact and when state law sets a higher floor, the CCPA as amended by the CPRA (consumer rights, business obligations, opt-out of sale), the wave of comprehensive state laws beyond California such as Virginia, Colorado, and Connecticut, biometric and AI laws including BIPA's written-policy and consent rules, and the patchwork of state data-breach notification requirements.
How to study it. Treat California as the anchor and learn the CCPA/CPRA rights and the opt-out of sale in detail, then learn the other comprehensive laws by how they differ from it (universal opt-out signals, data minimisation, consent for sensitive data) rather than from scratch. Hold BIPA's written-policy-and-consent requirement separately because it has a private right of action. For breach notification, compare laws along fixed axes: timing, covered data, who is notified, and the encryption safe harbour. Study from current sources, as this domain shifts year to year.
Easy to confuse
- CCPA opt-out of sale versus an opt-in consent regime. The CCPA/CPRA lets a business sell or share personal data unless the consumer opts out, whereas an opt-in regime forbids the use until the consumer affirmatively agrees. A right to stop a sale already under way points to California's opt-out model; a requirement to get permission first points to opt-in.
- BIPA versus a comprehensive state privacy law. BIPA is a narrow Illinois statute governing biometric identifiers, with a written-policy-and-consent requirement and a private right of action; a comprehensive state law such as Virginia's CDPA covers personal data broadly and is enforced by the attorney general. Biometric data plus individual lawsuits points to BIPA; broad consumer rights enforced by a regulator points to the comprehensive laws.
- Federal preemption versus the state floor. Preemption is when a federal law displaces conflicting state law; the state floor is when state law sets a higher standard that survives because the federal law sets only a minimum. If the scenario describes federal law overriding the state, that is preemption; if state law adds stricter protection on top, that is the floor.
Worked example from the CIPP-US bank
lock_openFree sampleState Privacy Lawshard
A bank that does business in several states uses a fully automated model to approve or deny consumer credit-line increases with no human involvement. Counsel is mapping which state comprehensive privacy laws give the consumer a right to opt out of this kind of profiling. Under the leading state comprehensive privacy model, what is the threshold that determines whether the consumer has an opt-out right over this automated decision?
- AWhether the automated model processes any personal data at all, since all automated processing triggers the profiling opt-out.
- BWhether the consumer has previously exercised a separate right to delete their personal data held by the bank.
- CWhether the profiling is carried out in furtherance of decisions that produce legal or similarly significant effects concerning the consumer.check_circle Correct
- DWhether the bank has annual revenue above a fixed dollar figure set by each state's profiling provision.
Recognise that state comprehensive privacy laws tie the profiling opt-out to automated decisions producing legal or similarly significant effects on the consumer. Under the Virginia, Colorado, and Connecticut comprehensive privacy models, the consumer's right to opt out of profiling is limited to profiling in furtherance of decisions that produce legal or similarly significant effects, such as credit, housing, or employment outcomes, rather than to all automated processing.
Why A is wrong: It is tempting to assume any automated processing triggers the right, but the opt-out is tied to significant-effect profiling, not to processing generally, so this overstates the scope.
Why B is wrong: Deletion and profiling opt-out are independent rights, so making one a precondition of the other confuses two distinct consumer entitlements under these statutes.
Why C is correct: State comprehensive laws such as the Colorado, Connecticut, and Virginia models grant an opt-out of profiling specifically when it is in furtherance of decisions producing legal or similarly significant effects, which a credit-line decision is.
Why D is wrong: Revenue thresholds appear in the applicability sections of some privacy laws, but the profiling opt-out is defined by the nature of the decision and its effect, not by a revenue figure inside the profiling provision.